The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in Macroeconomic Stabilization by Zvi Hercowitz & Jeffrey C. Campbell
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










Gadi Barlevy and Richard Suen provided insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We are grateful
to the National Science Foundation for research support through Grant 0137048 to the NBER. The views
expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago, the Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
©2005 by Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is
given to the source.  The Role of Collateralized Household Debt in Macroeconomic Stabilization
Jeffrey R. Campbell and Zvi Hercowitz




Market innovations following the financial reforms of the early 1980s relaxed collateral constraints
on household borrowing. The present paper examines the contribution of this development to the
macroeconomic  stabilization  that  occurred  shortly  thereafter.  The  model  combines  collateral
constraints on households with heterogeneity of thrift in a calibrated general equilibrium setup. We
use this tool to characterize the business cycle implications of lowering required down payments and
rates of amortization for durable goods purchases as in the early 1980s. The model predicts that this
relaxation of collateral constraints can explain a large fraction of the actual volatility decline in hours
worked, output, household debt, and household durable goods purchases.
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This paper examines the implications of the ¯nancial reforms in the early 1980's for macroe-
conomic volatility. The market innovations that followed the Monetary Control Act of 1980
and the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982 relaxed collateral constraints on household debt. The
well-known decline in macroeconomic volatility occurred a short time after these reforms.
Because this stabilization was particularly dramatic for residential investment, Stock and
Watson (2002, 2003) suggest these reforms as one of its sources. An examination of the
behavior of household debt, reported below, supports such a link. Debt starts to acceler-
ate at about the same time that macroeconomic volatility drops, and its standard deviation
goes down more than most key aggregates'. Additionally, debt is strongly correlated with
hours worked until the early 1980's, and much less so afterwards. Microeconomic evidence
also indicates a connection between labor supply and household debt. Using Canadian and
Italian data, Fortin (1995) and Del Boca and Lusardi (2003) found that the labor supply
of married women increases with their households' mortgage debts. Taken together, this
evidence motivates us to explore the connection between collateralized household debt, labor
supply, and macroeconomic volatility using a quantitative general equilibrium model.
The model combines trade between a patient saver and an impatient borrower with re-
alistic features of most household loan contracts in the U.S.|a required down payment and
rapid amortization. In equilibrium, the borrower has no ¯nancial assets. When expand-
ing purchases of home capital goods, the borrower must increase labor supply to ¯nance
down payments. The higher labor supply persists because of debt repayment. Relaxing
the collateral constraints|by reducing the down-payment rate or extending the term of the
loans|weakens the link between durable purchases, debt, and hours worked; and thereby
results in lower aggregate variability.
This paper follows Krusell and Smith (1998) in considering the cyclical implications of
heterogeneity in thrift interacting with a borrowing constraint|which in their framework
is a ¯xed zero-debt limit. In their economy's equilibrium, the limit practically disconnects
a large fraction of agents from the capital market. Krusell and Smith did not introduce
endogenous labor in this economy. We conjecture that such a modi¯cation would not change
aggregate behavior signi¯cantly since, with standard preferences, a constrained household
keeps hours worked constant.1 In contrast, the collateral requirement in our framework
ampli¯es constrained households' labor °uctuations by linking hours worked with durable
goods purchases.
1We return to this point in Footnote 11.
1In the present paper, home capital plays a dual role for households, as collateral for loans
and as an intrinsically valued good, just as market capital plays a dual role for ¯rms in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Endogenous transmission mechanisms arise in both setups. In
Kiyotaki and Moore, an exogenous shock that increases net worth of a credit-constrained
¯rm raises its investment. Iacoviello (2004) develops a model where this type of mechanism
also ampli¯es credit-constrained households' demand for goods. In the present framework,
the transmission mechanism works through labor supply of credit-constrained households.
We stress the role of collateral constraints by ¯rst using standard preferences and produc-
tion possibilities, subject to exogenous productivity shocks. With this speci¯cation, output
volatility depends primarily on the variance of the productivity shocks|as in the basic RBC
model|because inputs vary relatively little. Hence, relaxation of the collateral constraints
reduces output's volatility modestly in spite of a substantial stabilization of hours worked.
Following King and Rebelo (2000), we then introduce preferences and production possibilities
that reduce the size of the exogenous shocks consistent with a given volatility of output. This
version of the model predicts that relaxing collateral constraints does substantially reduce
macroeconomic volatility.
Models with home production also address the cyclical interaction of home capital with
hours worked. In those models, comovement depends on the technological role assigned
to home capital. Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright (2000) point out that home production
by itself should not generate a link between home capital and labor supply under perfect
capital markets. Fisher (2001) incorporates a mechanism by which home capital improves
the e®ectiveness of hours worked in the market. This setup generates a positive comovement
between home capital and labor supply by technological means. In our framework, the
interaction arises from ¯nancial factors.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the
history of household loan markets and their reforms. In Section 3 we present evidence on the
cyclical behavior of household debt and its association with the decline of macroeconomic
volatility. Section 4 presents the borrower-saver model, and in Section 5 the model's steady
state is used to analyze long-run responses to ¯nancial market reforms. Section 6 builds
intuition by analyzing the borrower's labor supply decisions in partial equilibrium. The
quantitative results from calibrated versions of the model are reported in Section 7, and
Section 8 concludes.
22 A Short History of Household Credit Markets
We present here a brief history of household credit markets to provide a context for our
analysis. In this section and in the rest of the paper we abstract from unsecured debt.
According to the Survey of Consumer Finances, homes and vehicles collateralized 85 percent
of total U.S. household debt in 1962 and almost 90 percent in 2001.2
Prior to the Great Depression, typical mortgage payments were only interest, and home-
owners re¯nanced their loans' principles every few years. Semer et. al. (1986) report that ¯rst
mortgages had low loan-to-value ratios, but second and third mortgages with higher interest
rates were common. For other household durable goods, a multitude of ¯nance companies
provided installment credit through retailers. (Olney (1991)).
The Great Depression and its aftermath a®ected these two segments of the household
lending market quite di®erently. Federal involvement in the mortgage market became mas-
sive, while other household credit was regulated much less. De°ation during the depression
period eroded housing values without a®ecting nominal balances due at maturity, so many
borrowers were unable to ¯nd lenders to re¯nance their loans. The resulting defaults mo-
tivated the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations to exercise greater federal control over
mortgage lending.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933
established a new environment for mortgage lending based on three regulatory principles.
First, regulation constrained savings and loans to raise most of their funds with short-term
deposits. Congress intended this to insulate the mortgage market from °uctuations in other
capital markets. Second, the federal government became savings and loans' lender of last
resort. Finally, long-term amortized mortgages replaced the previous interest-only, periodi-
cally re¯nanced mortgages. This reduced the possibility of systemic default risk at the cost
of raising borrowers' required equity in their homes.
Federal intervention in the mortgage market increased during the Korean War. In October
2From the Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, conducted in 1963, Projector and Weiss
(1966), Table 14, report that homes and real estate secured 77 percent of household debt, and automobiles
another 8 percent. Using data from the 2002 Survey of Consumer Finances, Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore
(2003) report that borrowing collateralized by residential property accounted for 81:5 percent of households'
debt in 2001 (Table 10), and installment loans, which include both collateralized vehicle loans and unbacked
education and other loans, amounts to an additional 12:3 percent. Credit card balances and other forms
of debt account for the remainder. The reported uses of borrowed funds (Table 12) indicate that vehicle
debt represents 7:8 percent of total household debt, and, hence, collateralized debt (by homes and vehicles)
represents almost 90 percent of total household debt in 2001.
31950, the Federal Reserve imposed tight limits on the maximum amounts borrowed and
minimum amortization rates (Regulation X) in order to reduce private demand. The Federal
Reserve suspended these limits in September 1952.3
The maturity imbalance between Savings and Loans' long-term assets and short-term
liabilities posed no challenge in a stable monetary environment, but the volatile ¯nancial
markets of the late 1960s and 1970s pushed many savings and loans into insolvency. By
1980, the Volker monetary policy made the Savings and Loans' regulatory environment un-
sustainable. The federal government abandoned the New Deal regulatory system with the
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Garn-St.Germain Act of 1982. This legislation elimi-
nated restrictions on mortgage lending and reintegrated it with other ¯nancial markets.4
Figure 1 illustrates the implications of credit market regulation since 1954. It plots the
ratio of mortgage debt to the value of owner-occupied housing, and the ratio of total household
debt to total tangible assets|owner-occupied housing and durable goods.5 The rapid increase
in the early part of the sample re°ects the relaxation of residential credit controls near the
end of the Korean War. This trend partially reverses in 1966 with the extension of interest
rate ceilings on demand deposits (Regulation Q) to Savings and Loans. The ratio declined
through the ¯nancial volatility of the late 1960s and 1970s. At the end of 1982 the debt-
asset ratios start a new dramatic increase. This surge re°ects the emergence of the subprime
mortgage lending market and households' greater use of home equity loans and mortgage
re¯nancing to cash-out previously accumulated equity. Greater access to re¯nancing and
home equity loans allowed homeowners to delay repayment of mortgage principle, and access
to additional subprime mortgages reduced e®ective down payment requirements. After 1995,
the ratios of household debt to tangible assets stabilize at new and higher levels.
Although only the mortgage market underwent dramatic regulatory changes, the auto-
mobile loan market also changed substantially. For the 1920s, Olney (1991) reports typical
terms of car loans of 1/3 down and a repayment period of 12-18 months. During the 1972-
1982 period, the average ¯gures are 13 percent down and repayment period of 40 months,
while in the 1995-2003 period, the corresponding averages are 8 percent down and repayment
3The suspension of Regulation X, before the war ended in July 1953, was due to a provision in the
authorizing statute that the restrictions would be interrupted if residential construction starts fell below a
pre-speci¯ed level.
4For a detailed chronology of events leading to ¯nancial market deregulation, see Florida (1986), and the
articles contained therein.
5The source of these observations is the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts, Table B.100, Balance
Sheet of Households and Nonpro¯t Organizations.
4period of 54 months.6 Hence, collateral requirements in this market eased considerably over
time.7
3 The Cyclical Behavior of Household Debt
The ¯nancial developments at the end of 1982 preceded a fast increase in household debt
and a dramatic change in its cyclical behavior. Figure 2 shows the °uctuations of total
real household debt and its comovement with hours worked. Real debt equals nominal
household debt de°ated by the GDP price index, and hours worked is an index of total private
weekly hours. Both variables are logged and HP-¯ltered. The Figure shows two remarkable
phenomena. First, debt's volatility declines dramatically in the early 1980s. Second, debt
and hours worked comove strongly until this time. Afterwards, their movements become
much less synchronized.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize these data. Three periods are considered: (1) From the begin-
ning of the sample in 1954:I through 1982:IV|the quarter of the Garn-St. Germain Act's
passage|(2) from 1983:I onwards, and (3) from 1995:I onwards.
Table 1 reports the standard deviations of total household debt and mortgage debt along
with those of other key macroeconomic variables in these three periods. The standard devia-
tion of total debt declines from 2.8 percent in the period through 1982:IV, to 0.6 percent from
1995:I onwards. The corresponding ¯gures for mortgage debt are 2.3 percent and 0.9 per-
cent. Table 1 also illustrates the decline in general macroeconomic volatility. The standard
deviations of hours worked, durable consumption expenditures, nondurable consumption ex-
penditures, and GDP all fall substantially after 1982; and they are even lower from 1995
onwards. As stressed by Stock and Watson (2002, 2003), the decline in investment volatility
re°ects primarily residential investment: Its standard deviation falls from 12 percent to 2.7
percent, while the standard deviation of nonresidential investment drops from 5.1 percent to
4.5 percent. Column (4) reports the ratios of the standard deviations in the last period to
those in the ¯rst. By this measure, household debt and residential investment stabilize the
most.
Table 2 quanti¯es the comovement of hours worked and debt. Prior to 1983, the correla-
tion coe±cients of total and mortgage debt with hours worked are 0.86 and 0.83, respectively.
These correlations are substantially lower in the post-1982 sample, and they are nearly zero
6The source of these observations is Federal Reserve Statistical Release G-19, Consumer Credit.
7We consider below in Footnote 21 the implications of assuming that the changes in repayment periods
re°ect increased durability of automobiles.
5from 1995 onwards. Thus, the strong positive link between hours worked and debt seems to
have broken down sometime after 1982.
One may wonder whether the levels of hours worked and household debt also changed.
Figure 3 plots the log-levels of per capita real household debt and hours worked.8 Both series
display a clear breaking point in 1983:I, when the debt accelerates|consistently with the
increase in the ratio of household debt to tangible assets from Figure 1|and hours worked
per capita begins a persistent increase.9
The evidence presented in this section indicates that the ¯nancial reforms of the early
1980s coincided with substantial macroeconomic changes. First, aggregate volatility de-
clined. In particular, the standard deviations of household debt, residential investment, and
durable purchases dropped dramatically. Second, the strong positive comovement between
hours worked and debt disappeared. Third, the levels of household debt and hours worked
increased. The remainder of this paper explores the possibility that these changes arose
endogenously following the exogenous relaxation of collateral constraints on household bor-
rowing.10
4 The Borrower-Saver Model
The model combines heterogeneity of time preference with collateral constraints. Household
debt re°ects intertemporal trade between an impatient borrower and a patient saver. We
denote their rates of time preference with ½ and %; where ½ > %: Durable goods collateralize
all household debt.
Without collateral constraints, the borrower's debt to the saver increases over time to
the maximum level the borrower can service using total labor income. Imposing collateral
constraints limits the debt, so the economy possesses a unique steady state with positive
8Both variables were constructed using the civilian noninstitutional population, 16 years and older.
9Mortgage debt displays similar behavior.
10Of course, other factors could account for these changes. For discussions of alternative explanations,
see McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-Quiros
(2002), Stock and Watson (2002, 2003), and Campbell and Fisher (2004). Among these, one explanation
related to ours holds that ¯nancial liberalization may a®ect macroeconomic volatility by increasing house-
holds' ability to smooth consumption. However, as Blanchard and Simon (2001) point out, this channel
does not seem a promising route for explaining the greater macroeconomic stability since the early 1980s.
The volatility of nondurable consumption and services should decline, but the volatility of durable purchases
should increase|due to easier adjustment towards optimal stocks. In contrast, the actual volatility of all
three components of consumption declined substantially since the early 1980s.
6consumption by both households. In general, the collateral constraint may bind only oc-
casionally. However, it always binds if the economy remains close to its steady state; so
standard log-linearization techniques can characterize its equilibrium for small disturbances.
This is the solution approach we follow below.
The remainder of this section presents the economy's primitives, discusses the households'
optimization problems, and de¯nes a competitive equilibrium.
4.1 Preferences
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In (1), ^ St and ^ Ct denote the borrower's consumption of durable and nondurable goods; and
^ Nt is the borrower's labor supply. Similarly, ~ St and ~ Ct are the saver's consumption of these
goods in (2).
The saver's preferences di®er from those of a borrower in two respects: The rate of time
preference is strictly smaller and they do not involve labor supply. The latter approximates
a situation where the saver's accumulated wealth is large enough so that the corresponding
labor supply decision is quantitatively unimportant.
4.2 Technology
The aggregate production function is
Yt = K
® (AtNt)
1¡® ; 0 < ® < 1: (3)
Here, Yt is output, K is a constant capital stock, Nt is labor input, and At is an exogenous
productivity index. The assumption that K is constant simpli¯es the analysis in an aspect
that is marginal in the present context|which focuses on household capital goods. Further-
more, capital stock movements are slow and thus not important for output volatility. We
discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption below in Section 7.5.
7Output can be costlessly transformed into nondurable consumption and durable goods
purchases. That is,
Yt = Ct + St+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)St;
where Ct and St are the aggregate nondurable consumption and durable goods stock at time
t. The durable good depreciates at the rate ±.
The productivity shock follows the AR(1) stochastic process
lnAt = ´ lnAt¡1 + ut; 0 · ´ < 1; (4)
where ut is an i.i.d. disturbance with zero mean and constant variance. We abstract from
growth in this paper.
4.3 Trade
A large number of ¯rms rent the ¯xed capital stock from households, purchase the borrower's
labor services, and sell output in perfectly competitive markets. The rental rate of capital
and the wage rate are denoted by Ht and Wt.
The collateralizable value of the durable goods stock is generally less than its replacement
cost. For the stock St+1; it is given by




j (St¡j+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)St¡j): (5)
Here, ¼ is the fraction of a new durable good that cannot serve as collateral, and Á is the
rate at which a good's collateral value depreciates. We assume that Á ¸ ±, so that the good's
value to a creditor declines at least as rapidly as its value to its owner. Collateral limits
household borrowing. That is,
^ Bt+1 · ^ Vt+1; ~ Bt+1 · ~ Vt+1; (6)
where ^ Bt+1 and ~ Bt+1 are the outstanding debts of the two households at the end of period
t, and ^ Vt+1 and ~ Vt+1 are the collateral values of their durable goods stocks. The gross (real)
interest rate on Bt+1 is Rt+1, which is determined at time t:
When collateral limits a household's borrowing, ¼ is the required down-payment rate for
durable goods purchases and Á is the rate at which the principal is repaid. We treat these
two parameters as exogenously determined by the regulatory environment.
8To complete the model's market structure, we assume that unbacked state-contingent
claims are unenforceable. Hence, the only security traded is one-period collateralized debt.
In this environment, the two households choose asset holdings, consumption of the two goods,
and (for the borrower) labor supply to maximize utility subject to the budget and the bor-
rowing constraints. Firms choose their outputs and inputs to maximize their pro¯ts. We
now turn to the characterization of each of these decision problems.
4.4 Utility Maximization
The condition that the market in collateralized debt must clear implies that the borrowing
constraint binds for at most one type of household. We conjecture that near the steady state it
binds for the borrower. After characterizing the steady state, verifying this is straightforward.
We now turn to the analysis of the households' utility maximization problems, given this
conjecture.
4.4.1 Utility Maximization by the Borrower
Consider ¯rst the borrower's problem given the assumption that (6) always binds for this
household. This allows us to replace ^ Vt+1 with ^ Bt+1 in (5) and rewrite the borrowing con-
straint as
^ Bt+1 = (1 ¡ Á) ^ Bt + (1 ¡ ¼)
³
^ St+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±) ^ St
´
. (7)
With a perpetually binding borrowing constraint, the borrower never purchases productive
capital. Hence, the corresponding budget constraint is
^ Ct + ^ St+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±) ^ St = Wt ^ Nt + ^ Bt+1 ¡ Rt ^ Bt: (8)
Given ^ B0 and ^ S0, the borrower chooses state-contingent sequences of ^ Ct, ^ St+1, ^ Nt, and ^ Bt+1
to maximize the utility function in (1), subject to the sequences of constraints in (7) and (8).
Denote the current-value Lagrange multiplier on (8) with ªt. If we express the Lagrange
multiplier on (7) as ¥tªt, then ¥t measures the value in units of either consumption good of
marginally relaxing the borrowing constraint.
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Equation (12) is the optimal labor supply condition. This equation can be used to high-
light the key role of durable goods for labor supply in this economy. When all consumption
is nondurable there are no collateralizable goods, so the borrower's budget constraint reduces
to ^ Ct = Wt ^ Nt. Substituting this into (12) yields Nt = 1=(Á + 1): Hours worked are constant
because the income and substitution e®ects of any wage change o®set each other exactly.11
Thus, removing collateralizable goods eliminates labor supply °uctuations. In this sense, the
market for household credit fundamentally shapes this economy's aggregate dynamics.
The remaining optimality conditions can be used to elaborate on the implications of
the collateral constraint for the borrower's choices. Equation (10) looks familiar, but the
collateral constraint changes its interpretation. For an unconstrained household, such as the
saver, it de¯nes the value of relaxing the intertemporal budget constraint. The borrower
does not have an intertemporal budget constraint, so ªt represents only the marginal value
of additional current resources.
A standard condition for optimal investment in durable goods equates the purchase price
of a durable good to its immediate payo® (the marginal rate of substitution between durable
and nondurable goods) plus its discounted expected resale value. Equation (11) has the
same interpretation if we de¯ne 1¡¥t (1 ¡ ¼) to be the e®ective relative price of the durable
good|the actual price less the bene¯t from relaxing the borrowing constraint by purchasing
one more unit.
Setting ¥t and ¥t+1 to zero reduces (13) to the standard Euler equation. When the
collateral constraint binds, ¥t in (13) can be interpreted as the price of an asset which allows
11 This point is related to the remark made in the Introduction about adding a leisure choice to Krusell
and Smith's economy with a no-borrowing constraint. Because borrowing-constrained agents|who should
supply a large share of the economy's labor|do not vary hours worked, we conjecture that this modi¯cation
would not change their economy's dynamics substantially.
10the holder to expand its debt by (1 ¡ Á)j; j ¸ 0; in period t + j. It equals the payo® to
additional current borrowing|the violation of the standard Euler equation|plus the asset's
appropriately discounted expected resale value.
4.4.2 Utility Maximization by the Saver
The maximization problem of the saver is standard, but we describe its solution here for the
sake of completeness. We impose the ownership of the entire capital stock on the saver, since
the borrower never owns capital if (7) always binds. Given the constant stock, ~ K; and the
initial durable goods and bonds, ~ S0 and ¡ ~ B0, the saver chooses state-contingent sequences
of ~ Ct, ~ St+1, and ~ Bt+1 to maximize utility subject to the sequence of budget constraints
~ Ct + ~ St+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±) ~ St ¡ ~ Bt+1 = Ht ~ K ¡ Rt ~ Bt: (14)
The right-hand side of (14) sums the sources of funds: Capital rental revenue, and principle
and interest income on bonds. The left-hand side includes the three uses of these funds:
Nondurable consumption, durable good purchases, and saving.
We denote the current-value Lagrange multiplier on (14) with ¨t. The ¯rst-order condi-


























and the budget constraint in (14). Equation (16) is a typical condition for optimal purchases
of durable goods, and (17) is the standard Euler equation.
4.5 Production and Equilibrium
The representative ¯rm takes the input prices as given. Letting Nt denote labor input used
by the ¯rm, pro¯t maximization implies that
















11With the economic agents' maximization problems speci¯ed, we de¯ne a competitive
equilibrium. Given the two households' initial stocks of durable goods, ^ S0 and ~ S0, the stock
of outstanding debt issued by the borrower and held by the saver, B0 = ^ B0 = ¡ ~ B0, the
predetermined interest rate on this debt, R0, and the initial value of the technology shock, a
competitive equilibrium is a set of state-contingent sequences for all prices and the borrower's,
saver's, and representative ¯rm's choices such that both households maximize utility subject
to the constraints, the representative ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t, and
Nt = ^ Nt;
K = ~ K;
Yt = ~ Ct + ^ Ct + ~ St+1 + ^ St+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)(~ St + ^ St);
Bt+1 = ^ Bt+1 = ¡ ~ Bt+1:
That is, input, product, and debt markets clear.
5 The Deterministic Steady State
We next characterize the economy's steady state. In light of the substantial long-run increases
in the ratio of debt to durable goods and in hours worked after 1982, we focus here on the
level e®ects of changing the parameters of the collateral constraint, ¼ and Á.
In the steady state, the saver's Euler equation immediately determines the interest rate,
R = e%. With R in hand, we calculate the borrower's choices. Equation (13) implies that
¥ =
1 ¡ e¡½R
1 ¡ e¡½ (1 ¡ Á)
=
1 ¡ e%¡½
1 ¡ e¡½ (1 ¡ Á)
> 0: (20)
Hence, the collateral constraint on the borrower binds at the steady state, as conjectured in







(1 ¡ ¥(1 ¡ ¼))(1 ¡ e¡½ (1 ¡ ±))
: (21)
This ratio depends negatively on the e®ective relative price of durable goods, 1 ¡ ¥(1 ¡ ¼):
Using (20), ^ S= ^ C can be expressed as function of the primitive parameters.
The collateral constraint in (7) immediately yields B=^ S. Using this, ^ S= ^ C from (21), the
borrower's budget constraint (8), and the optimal labor supply condition (12), yields ^ C as a
linear function of W.
12^ C = W=
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Given ^ C=W; the optimal labor supply condition (12) determines ^ N. Obtaining W, H, and the
rest of the borrower's steady-state choices is then straightforward. The steady-state capital
rental rate, the outstanding household debt, and the steady-state versions of (14) and (16)
then determine the saver's choices of ~ C and ~ S.
The steady state can be used to examine the long-run implications of changes in the
collateral requirements. Lowering ¼ has no impact on ¥; but it directly increases ^ S= ^ C and
B=^ S. Hence, ^ C=W decreases from (22), and N increases according to (12). Intuitively,
lowering the down-payment rate reduces the e®ective cost of durable goods to the borrower
and thereby induces a shift from leisure to durable goods. Also, the ratio of household debt
to the aggregate stock of durable goods, B=
³
^ S + ~ S
´
, the model's counterpart to the ratios
plotted in Figure 1, increases as the down-payment rate declines.12
Lowering the rate of debt repayment, Á; has the same qualitative implications as reducing
¼. In this case, the decline in the e®ective cost of durable goods re°ects an increase in ¥.
Thus, the changes in the model's steady state following a reduction in down-payment and
repayment rates are qualitatively consistent with the long-run changes in hours worked and
debt observed in the U.S. economy after 1982. In Section 7.6, we evaluate these e®ects
quantitatively.13
6 The Borrower's Labor Supply Decision
To develop intuition for interpreting the quantitative results in the next section, we charac-
terize here the borrower's response to wage changes in partial equilibrium. Assuming that
Á = ± simpli¯es this discussion.
If the borrower starts o® with no assets and no durable goods ( ^ B0 = ^ S0 = 0), then
^ Bt = (1 ¡ ¼) ^ St for all t ¸ 1: Replacing ^ Bt+1 and ^ Bt with (1 ¡ ¼) ^ St+1 and (1 ¡ ¼) ^ St; the
budget constraint becomes
12The ratio ~ S=B declines along with ^ S=B: The e®ect on ~ S=B can be shown using the budget constraints
of the two households and HK = ®
(1¡®)NW:
13Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2003) o®er another perspective on the long-run relationship between
hours worked and household durable goods. In their model, home durable goods substitute for labor in home
production. Hence, their increased adoption induces higher participation in market production.
13^ Ct + ¼ ^ St+1 = Wt ^ Nt + Rt
·
¼ ¡




In this form, the uses of the borrower's funds appear as nondurable consumption and down
payments on the desired stock of durable goods, and the sources of funds are labor income
and accumulated equity, [(1 ¡ ±) ¡ Rt (1 ¡ ¼)] ^ St; which can be written as the last term in
(23).

























Here, the marginal utility of durable goods consumption is equated with the utility cost
of working to acquire the down payment, less the expected utility next period from the
leisure-equivalent of accumulated equity.
The key term in both equations is ¼¡(Rt ¡ 1 + ±)=Rt; the di®erence between the down-
payment rate and the conventionally de¯ned user cost of durable goods. When the down
payment is higher than the user cost, the collateral constraint forces the borrower to acquire
some ownership of its durable goods stock. We focus next on two cases regarding this term.
6.1 Full Collateral
A benchmark case consists of setting Rt equal to a constant, R, and the down-payment rate
to ¼ = (R ¡ 1 + ±)=R. Here, the down payment covers only the user cost. We call this the
full collateral case, since the outstanding debt next period equals the depreciated durable
goods stock.
Consider the e®ects of changes in Wt. Because the last terms in both (23) and (24)
now equal zero, these equations and the ¯rst-order condition for ^ Nt are satis¯ed only by
an immediate and full adjustment of ^ Ct and ^ St+1 to the wage change, while ^ Nt remains
constant. These choices correspond exactly to those of a household facing no borrowing
constraints following a permanent wage change. Here, however, this result holds whether the
change is permanent or transitory. Therefore, full collateral eliminates completely the e®ects
of wage °uctuations on labor supply.
146.2 Partial Collateral
When ¼ > (R ¡ 1 + ±)=R, the borrowing constraint forces the household to accumulate
equity on its durable goods. Correspondingly, only a fraction of the durable stock can serve
as collateral. We label this case partial collateral.
With partial collateral, the borrower's accumulated equity is positive. Its presence in
the budget constraint, Equation (23), makes the unconstrained household's response to a
permanent wage change infeasible. Hence, the adjustment of ^ Ct and ^ St+1 must be less than
proportional to the wage. The optimal labor supply condition, Equation (12), and the decline
of ^ Ct=Wt then imply that ^ Nt rises above its long-run level. This occurs for both permanent
and transitory changes in wages.
From the borrower's partial equilibrium responses under full and partial collateral it fol-
lows that labor supply °uctuations arise from the required accumulation of equity on durable
goods. We now proceed to evaluate this source of business cycle propagation quantitatively.
7 Quantitative Results
To assess the quantitative implications of this framework for macroeconomic volatility, we
solve the model and simulate the impact of empirically relevant changes in household loan
markets. We consider ¯rst a regime of high collateral requirements, for which the parameters
¼ and Á are matched to observations through 1982:IV. The e®ects of the ¯nancial market
reforms in the early 1980s are then assessed by considering a regime of low collateral require-
ments, which is matched to observations from the period from 1995:I onwards. As shown in
Figure 1, the latter period corresponds to a stabilization of the ratios of household debt to
tangible assets after the reforms. We interpret this as convergence of credit markets to the
new environment.
7.1 Calibration
Only the parameters ¼ and Á are assumed to di®er across the two regimes. The available
data to calibrate these parameters are the terms of mortgage loans from 1963 onwards, and
of car loans from 1971 onwards.
We start with the high collateral-requirement regime. During the 1963-1982 period, the
average term of ¯rst mortgages for new home purchases is 98 quarters and the average down-
payment rate is 0.27. Over the 1971-1982 period, the average term of a new car loan is 13.4
15quarters and the average down-payment rate is 0.13.14
The 98 quarter term of home loans implies a linear repayment rate of 0.01 per quarter.
From the 13.4 quarter term for car loans, the corresponding repayment rate is 0.075. Using
the shares of mortgage debt and consumer credit during the 1954-1982 period|0:7 and 0:3
respectively|Á is set at the weighted average of the two repayment rates, 0:03:
Similarly, ¼ is a weighted average of the two down-payment rates, 0.27 and 0.13. We
construct the weights indirectly because there are no observations on the °ows of loans for
purchasing newly constructed homes. In a steady state, loans extended in each category
should equal the principle repayment rate multiplied by the category's steady-state debt.
Given the repayment rates and debt shares used to calibrate Á, the implied shares of home
and automobile loans in total loans extended are 0:24 and 0:76.15 The value of ¼ is set at
the weighted average down-payment rate of 0:16.
There is less information about ¼ and Á for the low collateral-requirement regime. The
available data on the terms of home loans cover only ¯rst mortgages. Given the scarcity
of re¯nancing and home equity loans prior to 1983, these data are representative of the
collateral constraints in this market. The ¯nancial reforms in the early 1980s substantially
widened these options, so that the terms of ¯rst mortgages cease to represent actual collateral
constraints. Re¯nancing and second loans have never been prominent features of automobile
¯nance, so the terms of new car loans continue to re°ect actual collateral constraints. During
the 1995:I-2004:II period, the average down-payment rate for cars fell to 0.11, and the average
term of car loans increased to 18 quarters.
Given that the post-1982 credit market liberalization a®ected mainly the mortgage mar-
ket, we assume that a decline in the e®ective down payment for homes of 5 percentage
points|the decline for car loans|is a conservative estimate. Hence, we set ¼ = 0:11 for
this regime. We assume that re¯nancing makes it possible to avoid home equity accumu-
lation altogether. Hence, the mortgage repayment rate should equal residential structures'
physical depreciation rate, 0:003 (see below). An 18 quarter auto loan term implies a linear
repayment rate of 0:055. The appropriately weighted average of these two repayment rates
is Á = 0:015:16
The remaining parameters are held constant across the two regimes. The production
function elasticity ® equals 0:3. The parameters of the exogenous productivity shock process
14Data on the terms of mortgages are from Federal Housing Finance Board's Monthly Interest Rate Survey.
Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.19 reports the terms of new automobile loans.
15The weight for home loans is computed as 0:01 £ 0:7=(0:01 £ 0:7 + 0:075 £ 0:3) = 0:237:
16The shares of mortgage debt and consumer debt in the 1995:I-2004:II period are 0.76 and 0.24.
16are set as follows. Using the value ´ = 0:95 from Hansen and Prescott (2001), ¾´ is calibrated
so that the model's standard deviation of output matches its actual counterpart in the 1954:I{
1982:IV sample. The resulting value is 0:008. The same values of ´ and ¾´ are then used
in the simulation of the second regime. The depreciation rate ± is 0.01, the appropriately
weighted average of 0.003 for owner occupied residences and 0.031 for cars.17
We chose % so that the quarterly interest rate is one percent. Because the borrower's
discount rate does not in°uence the interest rate, its calibration is more di±cult. We set
½ = 0:015; i.e., half of a percentage point higher than the interest rate. This degree of
impatience is similar in magnitude to that used by Krusell and Smith (1998). Using a model
with 3 levels of time preference, they calibrate the di®erences between each type as 0:36%;
or 0:72% between the two extremes. We have experimented with various values for this
parameter with almost identical results to those reported below.
The remaining parameters are µ and ': We chose these simultaneously to match an
average share of hours worked of 0:3 and the share of durable goods expenditure in total
households' expenditures in the 1954:I-1982:IV sample of 0:21.18 Given the other parameters
and the collateral requirements in this period, the unique values of µ and ' that replicate
these observations are 0:37 and 1:96. Table 3 summarizes the calibrated parameter values.
7.2 Household Borrowing and Aggregate Dynamics
We begin the quantitative analysis with a description of the two households' decisions in
general equilibrium with the model calibrated to the high collateral-requirement regime.
Figure 4 plots impulse responses of key variables to a positive productivity shock of 1=(1 ¡ ®)
percent. All the variables are expressed as percent deviations from their steady-state values.
The price responses are not shown since they are similar to those in the standard Real
Business Cycle model: The technology shock directly shifts up labor demand, so the wage
rises and thereafter falls slowly to its steady-state level. The interest rate response has a
similar shape, given the increased demand for consumption by both households, but it is
very small given both households' high interest sensitivity.
17The source is \Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods in the United States, 1925-97." The service
life of 1-4 units residences is 80 years. Automobiles' service life of 8 years is inferred from the reported
non-linear depreciation pro¯le. We used the weights 0.75 and 0.25, which are the shares of the owner occupied
residential stock and consumer durable goods stock in the 1954-2004 sample.
18To calculate this ratio, we adjusted the NIPA's nondurable personal consumption expenditures by sub-
tracting the imputed service °ow of housing. We then added residential investment to personal consumption
expenditures on durable goods.
17The individual households' responses illustrate the intertemporal exchange between them.
Although the technology shock increases the rental income from capital, the saver's durable
purchases and nondurable consumption re°ect the higher interest rate: Durable consumption
declines and nondurable consumption trends upwards. Hence, the saver's reaction is to
purchase the borrower's debt; helping to ¯nance a surge in the borrower's consumption.
As in the partial equilibrium discussion in Section 6, the increase in hours worked by the
borrower re°ects partial collateral: Labor supply must increase to ¯nance durable purchases.
A peculiar characteristic of the model is that temporarily higher income induces the
borrower to increase debt|in sharp contrast with the response of a household in a standard
model, or the saver in this model. This arises because the collateral constraint binds at all
times. Hence, borrowing cannot be a vehicle for consumption smoothing. It is here part of
the transaction of durable goods purchases.
7.3 Collateral Requirements and Aggregate Volatility
We turn now to the main issue in the paper: How important is the relaxation of the collateral
constraints for aggregate dynamics? Figure 5 compares the impulse responses of aggregate
variables under the two regimes, high and low collateral requirements, to the same 1=(1 ¡ ®)
percent increase in At:
In the low collateral-requirement regime, the responses of hours worked and the debt have
about half the magnitude of the responses in the high-requirement regime. The response of
hours worked re°ects the mechanism discussed in Section 6: Moving closer to full collateral
reduces the labor supply reaction to wage movements. The change in the response of the
debt follows mainly from the lower repayment rate. If Á > ±; a young durable good has more
collateral value than an old one with the same after-depreciation value to the owner. When
a positive shock reduces temporarily the average age of the borrower's durable goods stock,
its average collateral value increases accordingly. Given that the borrower fully exploits
borrowing opportunities, the ratio of debt to durable goods overshoots its long-run level.
This overshooting is eliminated when Á = ±; because then age is irrelevant for the collateral
value of a durable good. Lowering the collateral constraint makes Á much closer to ± and
greatly reduces debt overshooting.
Figure 5 also shows that the large proportional decline in the response of hours worked
produces only a small decline in the response of output. Given the standard utility and
production functions, the variation of hours worked is relatively small. Hence, the exogenous
productivity shock dominates output dynamics. In the next subsection, we follow King
18and Rebelo (2000) and introduce preferences and production possibilities that enhance the
contribution of labor °uctuations to output|and thereby reduce the exogenous variation of
the shocks required to match observed output volatility.
7.4 A High-Substitution Economy
Here we adopt both Hansen's (1985) utility function and a production technology with in-
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where 0 < µ < 1 and ° > 0.19 For the saver, there is no labor supply decision, so that the
utility function remains the same.
The production structure is changed to increase the elasticity of output with respect to
labor without altering the income shares of borrowers and savers. The production function
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A pro¯t maximizing monopoly produces each input at a constant marginal cost using im-
ported materials. Savers own all of these monopolies' shares.
If we set ® = 1 and solve for the representative ¯nal goods ¯rm's optimal level of Mt, we
can express its value added as a linear function of labor input,
Yt = ·AtNt;
where · is a constant.20 The elasticity of output with respect to labor is now unity. However,
labor's share in income is not one because the saver receives monopoly pro¯ts. These pro¯ts
19For computational purposes, we actually use µln ^ St +(1 ¡ µ)ln ^ Ct +°(1¡ ^ Nt)
1¡Â
1¡Â ; with a very small value
for Â:
20Another speci¯cation leading to a linear reduced form in labor without altering the capital share in
income is Yt = (MtK)
® (AtNt)
1¡® ; where Mt is here the utilization rate of capital, and the depreciation of
capital is linear in Mt: This is the speci¯cation used by King and Rebelo (2000).
19are the di®erence between total payments to the monopolies and their production costs. It
can be shown that savers' share of income is º = #¡#=(1¡#) ¡ #1=(1¡#):
Given that in this economy the capital share is º; we now calibrate this parameter, and
not ®; as 0:3: Also ¾´ is recalibrated. As with the basic economy, we chose its value so the
standard deviation of output in the high collateral-requirement regime equals the standard
deviation of output in the 1954:I-1982:IV period. Given the high-substitution nature of this
economy, this parameter is reduced from 0:008 in the baseline economy to 0:003. Finally, the
requirement that N = 0:3 implies that ° = 2:78:
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses for the two regimes in this economy. The di®er-
ence in output response between the high and low collateral-requirement regimes is more
pronounced than for the baseline economy, particularly on impact.
Table 4 presents the standard deviations of HP-¯ltered data from both economies. The
standard deviations for the baseline economy re°ect the impulse response functions in Figure
5: The decline in volatility is concentrated in debt and hours.
The results are substantially di®erent for the high-substitution economy, on which we
focus henceforth. The last column of Table 4 shows that, except for nondurable consumption,
volatility is substantially lower in the low collateral-requirement regime. For output, the ratio
of the standard deviation in the low-requirement regime to its high-requirement counterpart
is 0:66. The actual ratio from periods 1995:I-2004:II and 1954:I-1982:IV in Table 1 is 0:52.
Hence, the present mechanism can reproduce a large part of the decline in output volatility.
Similarly for the debt: The model's volatility ratio is 0.37, while the actual counterpart is
0.23. The model reproduces the actual ¯nding that the decline in the volatility of the debt
is the most pronounced. The volatility decline in hours worked is overstated: The model's
ratio is 0.42, and in the data it is 0.58.21
The model does less well in accounting for the dramatic stabilization of durable pur-
chases. The ratio of standard deviations from the low- and high-requirement regimes is 0:54.
The actual ratios for residential investment and durable consumption purchases are 0:23
and 0:39. The model's most counterfactual result is the small decline in the volatility of
21The results are very similar when we assume that the di®erence in repayment rates of car loans across
periods (0:075 per quarter prior to 1983 and 0:055 from 1995 onwards) re°ects a parallel di®erence in cars'
depreciation rates. Setting the depreciation rates of cars as 0:051 in the ¯rst regime and 0:031 in the second|
the same rate as above|the weighted average depreciation rate for the ¯rst regime is ± = 0:017 and for the
second it remains ± = 0:01: Using the same values for the other parameters, except for recalibrating ¾n to
0:0048, the results remain very similar to those presented above, and in particular, the ratio of standard
deviations of output is unchanged.
20nondurable consumption: The model's volatility ratio is 0:93; while the actual ratio is 0:52.
The reason for these results follows from the argument presented in Section 6: Lowering
collateral requirements moves consumption behavior closer to that of a permanent-income
consumer. This tends to increase consumption's volatility given the high persistence of the
shocks, o®setting the e®ects of the overall stabilization.
The decline in the correlation of hours worked with the debt, which is very large in the
data, is small in the model. The correlation goes down from 0:63 to 0:59; compared to the
actual decline from 0:86 to ¡0:08 shown in Table 2. The impulse responses of both variables
are substantially lower in the low collateral-requirement regime, but their shapes do not
change much. With only one shock in the model, this implies that their correlation changes
little.
7.5 Two Modi¯cations of the Model
We explore two modi¯cations of the model in order to test the robustness of the results. One
modi¯cation is to allow the capital stock to vary over time, and the other is to introduce an
additional shock.
A variable capital stock implies that the saver has an additional avenue for intertemporal
optimization. Given the capital share ® + º = 0:3; we assume that ® = 0:1 and º =
0:2: The impulse responses from these economy display a well known problem with models
with multiple capital stocks. Immediately following a shock there is a dramatic increase in
productive investment along with a similarly strong decline in savers' purchases of durable
goods. In the following period the pattern is reversed. This instability re°ects the lack
of adjustment costs for capital: Productive investment is built ¯rst all-at-once, and then
the durable goods stock is increased. Introducing adjustment costs would alleviate this
counterfactual behavior. Our assumption above that the capital stock is constant represents
an extreme form of adjustment costs. The experiment of lowering the collateral requirements
in this economy yields similar results as those obtained previously. The ratio of the standard
deviation in the low collateral-requirement regime to its high-requirement counterpart is 0:72,
somewhat higher than the 0:65 ratio in the previous results. The di®erence is due to the fact
that in this economy, the elasticity of output with respect to labor is lower than 1. Hence,
the change in labor volatility contributes less to reducing output's volatility.
The second modi¯cation is to introduce an income redistribution shock, assumed to be
independent of the productivity shock. In the basic structure of the model, the borrower
expands labor supply to ¯nance down payments and debt repayment. The additional source
21of funds introduced here relaxes this link, and generates an opposite comovement between
hours worked and debt. These funds make it possible to reduce hours and to increase down
payments|and hence the debt|simultaneously. We calibrate the stochastic properties of
the additional shock to the behavior of real social bene¯ts to persons.22
With the two shocks in the model, the ratio of the standard deviation in the low-
requirement regime to its high-requirement counterpart is 0:66; the same as with one shock.
The correlation of hours worked with the debt goes down here from 0:59 to 0:45: This decline
is more pronounced than in the one-shock economy, but still far from the actual change.
Under high collateral-requirements, the redistribution disturbance in isolation does generate
a strong negative comovement between hours and the debt. However, moving from high to
low collateral-requirements weakens this negative comovement signi¯cantly, and hence the
over-all correlation declines only moderately. The results are similar if instead of redistri-
bution we introduce a wealth shock to everyone|as with government spending ¯nanced by
lump-sum taxes. In conclusion, adding disturbances working through the budget constraints
does not alter the results about the stabilizing role of relaxing collateral requirements. Addi-
tionally, these disturbances contribute only partially to the explanation of the decline in the
correlation of hours worked and the debt.
7.6 Comparison of Level Changes
Figures 1 and 3 indicate that the increase in the ratio of the debt to the durable stock
following the reforms in the early 1980s coincides approximately with the trend change in
hours worked per capita. The steady-state analysis in Section 5 predicts qualitatively that
both hours worked and the ratio of debt to the durable stock should increase following a
relaxation of the collateral constraints. Here, using the parameter values and the model's
steady state, we evaluate these changes quantitatively, and compare them to the actual
changes from 1954:I-1982:IV to 1995:I-2004:II.
The percentage increase in average hours per-capita across these two sample periods is
6:6 percent. In the baseline economy, the steady-state increase from the high to the low
collateral-requirement regime is 5:6 percent, and in the high-substitution economy it is 8:1
percent. Hence, the model predicts the order of magnitude of the change in hours worked.
22Using HP-¯ltered real transfers (nominal ¯gures divided by the GDP price index), the estimated AR(1)
statistics are a serial correlation of 0:73 and standard deviation of the innovation of 0:02. The average share
of these transfers in GDP during the sample is 0:08. With the additional shock, the recalibrated ¾´ is slightly
lower than the previous value 0.003.
22Regarding the ratio of debt to the durable stock, the average ratio for the period 1954:I-
1982:IV is 0:34; and for 1995:I-2004:II it is 0:41: In the two model economies, the ratios in
the high and low collateral-requirements regimes are 0:18 and 0:36. The prediction for the
second period is not far from the actual ratio, but the model underpredicts it in the period
with high collateral requirements.
The fact that the model generates a large increase in the ratio of household debt to
assets is a fairly direct consequence of the relaxation of the collateral constraint. It is more
surprising, however, that this ¯nancial change can also reproduce the observed increase in
hours worked.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper concentrates on the implications of collateral constraints on household debt for
macroeconomic stability. The mechanism works through labor supply|lowering collateral
requirements weakens the connection between constrained households' investment in durable
goods and their hours worked.
The striking change in the behavior of household debt and hours worked after the ¯-
nancial deregulation of the early 1980s coincided with the macroeconomic volatility decline.
We believe that this evidence warrants our focus on the link between household borrowing
and labor supply. The quantitative results indicate that weakening this link substantially
contributed to macroeconomic stability. The model also predicts the higher observed levels
of hours worked and household debt.
The analysis in this paper abstracts from the implications of the ¯nancial reform for wel-
fare. A comparison of steady states reveals nothing in this respect, because the intertemporal
substitution that bene¯ts the borrower occurs along the transition path. We expect borrow-
ing against home equity accumulated before the reform and changes in the tax treatment of
non-mortgage interest to be quantitatively signi¯cant aspects of the transition path.
We conclude by noting that the interaction of borrowers and savers in the presence of
collateral constraints might have interesting implications for the analysis of monetary trans-
mission. Lowering the interest rate in a model with standard intertemporal substitution
contracts labor supply by reducing the price of current leisure relative to future leisure. In a
monetary version of the present model, we expect a lower interest rate to expand labor supply
by increasing the demand for durable goods. Hence, we believe that monetary economies
that include collateral requirements for household borrowing merit investigation.
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Total Debt(ii) 2:76 1:93 0:63 0:23
Mortgage Debt(ii) 2:29 1:81 0:93 0:41
Hours Worked 1:96 1:49 1:13 0:58
Residential Investment 12:00 5:33 2:70 0:23
Nonresidential Investment 5:12 4:57 4:54 0:89
Durable Goods(iii) 5:66 3:17 2:21 0:39
Nondurable Goods & Services(iii,iv) 1:87 1:10 1:09 0:58
Output 1:88 1:11 0:97 0:52
Notes: (i) All variables are logged and HP-¯ltered over the period 1954:I-2004:II. (ii) Nominal
debt divided by the chain-weighted GDP de°ator. (iii) Personal consumption expenditures
on the given category. (iv) We chain subtracted housing services from personal consumption
expenditures on nondurable goods and services.
26Table 2: Correlation Coe±cients of HP-¯ltered Hours and Debt(i)
Sample Period
1954:I-1982:IV 1983:I-2004:II 1995:I-2004:II
Total Debt & Hours Worked 0:86 0:45 ¡0:08
Mortgage Debt & Hours Worked 0:83 0:29 0:09
Note: (i) All variables are logged and HP-¯ltered over the period 1954:I-2004:II.
Table 3: Calibrated Parameter Values







0:3 0:95 0:008 0:01 0:01 0:015 0:37 1:96
Table 4: The Model Economy's Standard Deviations(i)
Baseline Economy High-Substitution Economy
High
(ii) Low(ii) Ratio High
(ii) Low(ii) Ratio
Debt 2.21 1.00 0.45 2.02 0.75 0.37
Hours Worked 0.59 0.26 0.44 1.20 0.50 0.42
Nondurable Consumption 0.81 0.85 1.06 0.62 0.58 0.92
Durable Purchases 6.38 4.83 0.76 7.43 4.04 0.54
Output 1.88 1.65 0.88 1.88 1.25 0.66
Notes: (i) The entries are population standard deviations of logged and HP-¯ltered observa-
tions. (ii) Type of collateral requirement.







0.48 Household Debt / Tangible Household Assets
Mortgage Debt / Owner Occupied Real Estate
Figure 1: Ratios of Households' Debts to their Tangible Assets






Figure 2: HP Filtered Real Household Debt and Hours Worked(i)
Note: (i) Debts and Assets measured at current market values.




Real Household Debt per Capita






Hours Worked per Capita
Figure 3: Real Household Debt and Hours Worked
Notes: The panels plot the logarithms of per capita hours worked and nominal household
debt divided by the de°ator for GDP. The average value of hours worked and the value in
1982 of real debt are normalized to zero. See the text for further details.
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Figure 4: Household Responses with High Collateral Requirements to a Technology Shock
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Figure 5: Aggregate Responses to a Technology Shock
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Figure 6: Aggregate Responses to a Technology Shock in the High-Substitution Economy
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